Military Order of the Loyal Legion 
of the United States 

Commandery of the District of Columbia 



WAR PAPER 

"Farragut and Mobile Bay-— Personal 
Reminiscences" 



By 

COIsfPANlON 
Rear-Admiral JOHN C. WATSON 

United States Navy 



No. 98 



READ AT THE STATED iVLEETING OF 

DECEI\rEET7 Ifi. 1016 



Military Order of the Loyal Legion 
of the United States 

Commandery of the District of Columbia 



WAR PAPER 

"Farragut and Mobile Bay — Personal 
Reminiscences" 



By 

COMPANION 
Rear- Admiral JOHN Cf WATSON 

United States Navy 



No. 98 



READ AT THE STATED MEETING OF 
DECEMBER 16, 1916 



^ 



FARRAGUT AND MOBILE BAY— PERSONAL 
i^ REMINISCENCES. 

' I most heartily wish that all his fellow-countrymen — you 

companions especially — could have known that noble American 
seaman, David Glasgow Farragut, who was trained from his 
early boyhood to give to his country the very best service of 
which he was capable. When Flag Officer Farragut hoisted 
his flag on the Hartford at the Philadelphia Navy Yard in 
January, 18G2, I was a Master in the Navy and navigator of 
that ship. On being presented to him, in company with the 
other officers, he took me a little aside and told me, in the 
kindest possible way, that he was sorry to have to tell me I 
was not to remain on the Hartford, but was to be relieved by 
another Master (a grandson of Mr. Crittenden). His kind 
sympathy touched me, and I smilingly told him I was that 
:^ortunate Master who would sail aboard his flagship, and 
hoped and trusted that with the discharge of my duties I 
would win his confidence. At that time Farragut was over 60 
years of age, but was remarkably active and alert, both bodily 
and mentally. He was just about my height and build, though 
after the summer of 1864 he grew much stouter. Up to that 
year he had on several successive birthdays tested his supple- 
ness by holding with his right hand his left foot by the toe of 
the left shoe while he hopped through the bight or loop, for- 
wards and backwards. He was a most accomplished fencer, 
and was not averse to testing his skill with the single stick 
against the most proficient seamen on board. When he spent 
an evening on shore he always wore his sword, feeling perfectly 
confident of his ability to protect himself with it from possible 
attacks in passing through the slums or along the wharves. 



4 . 

/ 

FarragLit was a very religious man. He loved to have me read 
to him from the Bible. He made it very evident that he always 
believed the issue was with God, while recognizing that he 
must do his best. 

Farragut had a very high sense of duty, but at the same 
time he was considerate to those under him, as is shown by 
the following incidents : The Sebago, commanded by Lieut. 
Comdr. Fitzhugh, was one of the vessels selected to take part 
in the battle of Mobile Bay, but she was injured in collision, 
so that the .\dmiral decided not to let her go in. After this 
decision had been announced, Fitzhugh besought me, almost 
with tears in his eyes, to beg the Admiral to let him take part. 
I made the request, and Farragut answered that he deeply 
sympathized with Fitzhugh's desire to be in the battle, but he 




ADMIR.'XL F.ARR.\GUT AND HIS AIDE, LIEUTEXAXT-COMMAXDER 
J. C. WATSON 



had to consider the public interest, and this required that only 
the most efficient ships be used. On receiving a jeweled sword, ^ 
which was presented to him by the Union League Club of New 
York for his brilliant services to the Union, he sent it forward 
for the crew to see, with the message that they had helped him 
to earn it. 

In this connection my heart swells with joy and pride when 
I recall (in proof of the fact that I had won the Admiral's 
confidence by my discharge of the duties he entrusted to me as 
his confidential aid) the affection which he expressed for me. 
He once wrote to his son: "I am almost as fond of Watson 
as of yourself." 

It was not very long after the capture and occupation of New 
Orleans that Farragut urged the seizure and occupation of 
U^Iobile Bay. He believed an inside blockade was the only 
absolutely efficient blockade. Furthermore, he thought the 
moral effect of the recent successful passage of the Mississippi 
River forts would count for a good deal, especially before the 
Bay forts were strengthened. Farragut informed General 
Butler that he was willing to undertake to pass in and hold the 
lower Bay if Biltler would assist with even so small a force as 
1.000 or l,-500 men. He never had the slightest doubt of being 
able to pass inside the Bay and cut the forts off from the 
upper Bay and city ; but fully realized that as long as Forts 
Powell and Gaines prevented supplies reaching his ships he 
would be compelled, in a comparatively short time, to pass out 
again under the fire of Fort Morgan. General Butler was 
always willing to co-operate, but did not have sufficient troops 
to spare for this expedition. Banks, who succeeded Butler, 
considered it necessary to first occupy places on the Mississippi, 



'This jeweled sword has been presented to the Government by Mr. Loyall Farragut with 
the request that it be kept where it can be seen by the Admiral's fellow citizens. It will 
be exhibited in the historic section of the New National Museum. 



and the Red River expedition was given precedence, contrary 
to General Grant's judgment. Official correspondence shows 
that Generals Canby and Gordon Granger were also willing to 
co-operate with Farragut as far as lay in their power. As 
time passed, Farragut became very urgent that Mobile Bay be 
taken and held, because of a credible report that the Confed- 
erates had built one ironclad at Selma and were building an- 
other. As a matter of fact, they had built one — the Tennessee 
— which, after most discouraging difficulties and disasters, was 
finally floated over Dog River bar on May 20, 1SG4, and 
brought to anchor under the guns of Fort Morgan, where she 
was observed flying the flag of the Confederate Admiral, 
Franklin Buchanan. Her officers soon found she was unsea- 
worthy and so slow and sluggish in her movements, even in 
smooth water, as to be a failure as a ram. They concealed 
these facts, however, from their own people, as well as from 
the enemy. The Confederate newspapers were claiming that 
the Tennessee would go out and sink the blockaders or drive 
them away. Farragut's correspondence shows his eagerness 
for her to come out while he was on the spot, as he was firmly 
convinced that in a seaway he could destroy her with his heavy 
ships. After weeks of futile waiting for the Tennessee to 
come out he had to leave the blockade temporarily, and became 
exceedingly anxious to go in, provided he could have at least 
one monitor which would be able to follow the Tennessee in 
case she remained in shoal water where the heavy ships could 
not reach her. At last four monitors were promised him. and 
they were due at Sand Island not later than August 3. So it 
was arranged that the Union troops, under General Granger, 
were to land behind Fort Gaines on the afternoon of the 3d 
and threaten it, and that the fleet should attack the morning of 
the 4th. One of the monitors, the Teeuinseh, accompanied by 



the Richmond, did not arrive until about sunset the afternoon 
of the 4th, in spite of the utmost efforts of her commander 
(Commander T. A. M. Craven) and of Captain Thornton A. 
Jenkms, of the Richmond, commanding, the Second Division- 
of the fleet, to get her away from the Pensacola Navy Yard, 
prepared to take her part in the battle. This delay caused 
Farragut much mortification. The soldiers certainly got ahead 
of the sailors that time. As soon as the Tccumseh appeared I 
went aboard of her, delivered to Commander Craven the 
Admiral's instructions for the battle, and guided her to her 
anchorage. In the meantime, a party of Army signal ofificers 
arrived, and were distributed among the heavy vessels of the 
Beet. First Lieutenant J. C. Kinney, Thirteenth Connecticut, 
was assigned to the Hartford, and he has written a most inter- 
esting and detailed account of the Bay fight, called "An August 
Morning with Farragut," which appeared in the Century for 
May, 1881, and which has since been revised and extended in 
"Battles and Leaders of the Civil War." 

An early breakfast was ordered for the next mornino-. 
August 5, and by 5 o'clock the seven smaller vessels which had 
been selected as consorts to the heavy ships had moved along- 
side of them, and about half past 5, when they had all been 
securely lashed in pairs, the Admiral, who was just finishing 
breakfast, directed Captain Drayton to signal the fleet to take 
the stations assigned and move in in obedience to instructions. 
I made the necessary signals. , The ships got their positions 
very slowly, because of a slight haze, and proceeded in accord- 
ance with G. O. No. 10 and No. 11. The fleet was arranged in 
the following order, the monitors being sliglitly in advance and 
tnrthe starboard side of the wooden ships: 



Octorora, 

Lt. Comdr. 

C. H. Green. 

Metacomet, 

Lt. Comdr. 

James E. Jouett. 

Port Royal, 

Lt. Comdr. 

Bancroft Gherardi. 

Seminole, 

Comdr. 

J. Donaldson. 

Kennebec, 

Lt. Com'dr. 

W. P. McCann. 

Itasca, 

Lt. Comdr. 

George Brown. 

Galena. 

Lt. Comdr. 

Clark H. Wells. 



Brooklyn, 

Capt. 

James Alden. 

Hartford, 

Capt. 

Percival Drayton. 

Richmond, 

Capt. 

Thornton A. Jenkins. 

Lackazi'a)ina, 

Capt. 

J. B. Marchand. 

Monongahela, 

Capt. 

J. H. Strong. 

Ossipce, 

Capt. 

W. E. LeRoy. 

Oneida, 

Comdr. 

J. R. M. Mullany. 



Tccumsch, 

Comdr. 

'. A. AL Craven. 

Manhattan, 

Comdr. 

W. A. Nicholson. 

Winnebago, 

Comdr. 

T. H. Stevens. 

Chickasazv, 

Lt. Comdr. 

G. H. Perkins. 



The Brooklyn was given the honor of leading the coUimn. in 
deference to the ahnost unanimous opinion of the commanding 
officers of the fleet, because she carried four heavy chase guns 
and an ingenious arrangement for picking up torpedoes. Far- 
ragut was loath to give up the leading position, believing that 
rank carried with it corresponding responsibility, but he finally 
yielded, for the above reasons. (See Diagram.) 

G. O. No. 10 was as follow^ s : "Strip your vessels and pre- 
pare for the conflict. Send down all your superfluous spars 
and rigging. Trice up or remove the whiskers. Put up the 
sjilinter nets on the starboard side, and barricade the wheel 
and steersmen with sails and hammocks. Lay chains or sand 



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10 

bags on the deck over the machinery, to resist a plunging fire. 
Hang the sheet chains over the side, or make any arrangement 
for security that your ingenuity may suggest. Land your 
starboard boats or tow them on the port side, and lower the 
port boats to the water's edge. Place a leadsman and the 
pilot in the port quarter-boat. The ships will run past the 
forts in couples, lashed side by side, as hereinafter designated. 
The flagship will lead and steer from Sand Island N. by E. by 
compass until abreast of Fort Morgan, then N. W. half N. 
until past the Middle Ground, then N. by W., and the others, 
as designated in the drawing, will follow in due order until 
ordered to anchor ; but the 'bow and quarter-line' must be 
preserved to give the chase guns a fair range, and each vessel 
must be kept astern of the broadside of the next ahead. Each 
vessel will keep a little oil. the starboard side of the next ahead, 
and when abreast of the fort will keep directly astern, and as 
we pass the fort will take the same distance on the port quarter 
of the next ahead, to enable the stern guns to fire clear of the 
next vessel astern. It will be tl»e object of the Admiral to get 
as close to the fort as possible before opening fire. The ships, 
however, will open fire the moment the enemy opens upon us. 
Use short filses for the shell and shrapnel, and as soon as 
within 300 or 400 yards give them grape. If one or more of 
the» vessels be disabled, their partners must carry them through, 
if possible; but if they cannot, the next astern must render 
the required assistance, but as the Admiral contemplates mov- 
ing with the flood tide, it will only require sufificient power to 
keep the crippled vessels in the channel. Vessels that can must 
place guns on the poop and topgallant forecastle and in the 
tops on the starboard side. Should the enemy fire graj^e, they 
will remove the men from the topgallant forecastle and poop 
to the guns below until out of grape range. The howitzers 



11 

must keep up a constant fire from the time they can reach with 
shrapnel until out of its range." 

G. O. No. 11: ''Should any vessel be disabled to such a 
degree that her consort is unable to keep her in her station, 
she will drop out of line westward and not embarrass the 
vessel next astern by attempting to regain her station. Should 
she repair damages so as to be able to re-enter the line of battle, 
she will take her station in- the rear, as near the last ship as 
possible. So soon as the vessels have passed the fort and kept 
away to the N. W., they can cast off the gunboats at the discre- 
tion of the senior officer of the two vessels, and allow them to 
proceed up the Bay and cut off the enemy's gunboats that may 
be attempting to escape. There are certain black buoys placed 
by the enemy across the channel from the piles on the west 
side of the channel toward Fort Morgan. It being understood 
there are torpedoes and other obstructions between the buoys, 
the vessels will take care to pass eastward of the easternmost 
buoy, which is clear of all obstructions. The Admiral will 
endeavor to remove the others before the day of attack (as he 
thinks they support what will otherwise sink), and at least 
to destroy them for guides to the demons who hope to ex- 
plode them. So soon as the vessel is opposite the end of the 
piles, it will be best to stop the propeller of the ship and let 
her run in with her headway and the tide, and those havino- 
side-wheel gunboats will continue on with the aid of their 
paddles, which are not likely to foul with their drag-ropes." 

Before General Order No. 11 was issued, Farragut had the 
carpenter make some little wooden blocks, shaped like boats, 
.with which he experimented on a table or board, on which the 
points of the compass were traced, to determine the best posi- 
tion of the vessels with reference to each other in entering the 
Bay. I used to help him maneuver the little blocks so as to con- 



12 

centrate and maintain as heavy a fire as possible upon Fort 
Morgan when we should be going in, and also, after these 
General Orders were issued, we played with the blocks pre- 
paratory to practicing the ships in keeping close order when 
under way, at varying speeds. 

Finally, after the completion of all details and the fleet 
was ready, about G.45 a. m. of this glorious August 5th. the 
.Tecumseh fired a scaling shot from each of her two lo-inch 
guns and then loaded each of them with the heaviest charge 
and a solid shot in anticipation of attacking the Tennessee. 
The ships drew slowly ahead, assisted by the young tide. Fort 
Morgan opened fire about 7.10 a. m.. and the Brooklyn replied 
almost immediately with her bow-chasers; the other ships 
opening with their guns as soon as they would bear. All went 
well until about half past 7 o'clock, when the Brooklyn, having 
drawn ahead of the two river monitors, suddenly stopped, 
arresting the advance of the fleet. This threatened the most 
serious disaster, as the flood-tide was sweeping the ships to- 
gether in confusion under the guns of the Confederate bat- 
teries. At the beginning of the action, Farragut was standing 
in the port main rigging on the sheer pole, just on a level with 
the hammock netting and quite near the commanding ofticer 
of the Metacomet, Jouett. who was standing on her starboard 
paddle box. He had gradually mounted higher and higher as 
the smoke grew denser, until he found himself in the futtock 
shrouds, just under the main top, where he was secured by a 
lashing, which Knowles, the Signal Quartermaster, carried up 
to him by direction of Captain Drayton. From this position 
Farragut hailed the deck to know why the Brooklyn had 
stopped. He was told she had signaled that she was forging 
ahead of the monitors. He ordered a signal made to her to 
signal the monitors to go ahead and to go ahead herself; this" 



13 

signal was made by Lieutenant Kinney by wig-wag. Instead 
of going ahead, t^ie Brooklyn was soon seen to be backing, and 
in doing so her bow swung across the bow of the Hartford, 
closing the narrow passage to the east of the line of torpedoes. 
Farragut hailed again, and all that could be distinguished of 
her reply was something about torpedoes. I was standing on 
the poop deck at the time, and heard the Admiral shout, on 
the instant, it seemed : "Damn the torpedoes ! Full speed 
ahead, Drayton ! Hard a starboard ! Ring four bells ! Eight 
bells ! Sixteen bells !" I think he also called to Commander 
Jouett, of the Metacomet, to back, for she did so. By this 
movement we all knew that Farraguet had decided suddenly- 
to cross the torpedo field, which he had forbidden any of the 
ships to do. Some of us expected every moment to feel the 
shock of an explosion under the Hartford and to find our- 
selves in the water. In fact, we imagined that we heard some 
caps explode. If so, they failed to explode a torpedo, for we 
passed through the field in safety. Then there was a race 
between the Brooklyn and the Richmond as to which should 
be the first to follow the Hartford. The rest of the fleet fol- 
lowed in their wake, and probably no straighter course was 
ever kept than by these ships in passing over that torpedo field, 
the furrow made by the Hartford being accurately followed. 
Although this action of Farragut's seemed instantaneous, we 
learn from letters to his family that he had found time to ask 
God for guidance, and he believed he heard a voice say, "Go 
on!" On several previous occasions h'e had said to me that 
inevitably many of the torpedoes were leaky and would not 
explode, and a good many had probably drifted from their 
moorings. 

In the meantime the Tennessee and the three other Con- 
federate vessels had taken up positions inside the Bay so as to 



14 

rake the Union fleet as it changed its course in entering the Bay. 
This took them inside of. but to the west of the eastern red 
buoy. In her eagerness to attack the Tennessee, the Tecumseli 
put her helm to starboard and headed directly for her, her 
course taking her to the west, or wrong, side of this buoy. 
When she was within 200 yards of the Tennessee she was seen 
to reel and then plunge headfirst to the bottom. This disaster 
occurred just after the Brooklyn had begun to back. Some of 
the Hartford's crew raised a cheer, thinking it was the Ten- 
nessee which had been sunk ; but Farragut, who had seen the 
accident, ordered Jouett to lower a boat and pick up any 
survivors. ; 

My admiration for the Admiral knew no bounds when I 
realized that this appalling disaster had not affected his deci- 
sion to cross the torpedo field. As the fleet was steaming up 
the Bay, after passing Fort Morgan, the Monongahela rammed 
the Tennessee on her port quarter, but the ram put her helm 
to starboard and it was only a glancing blow. The Tennessee 
poured a destructive broadside into the last ships of the fleet 
and then steamed to her anchorage under the guns of the fort. 

While the fleet was anchoring up at the northern end of the 
lower Bay in obedience to orders from the flagship. Captain 
Drayton reported to the Admiral, who was standing near me 
on the poop deck, that the ram was under way and going out 
to sink the vessels left outside. Drayton was ordered to get 
the Hartford under way at once and follow her out. I confess 
that I heard this order'with consternation, as it meant that- we 
would have to run the gauntlet of the guns and torpedoes again. 
Farragut was soon convinced by observation the ram was head- 
ing for us, and he was impatient for the Hartford to get under 
way. I was ordered to signal the heavy ships in succession : 
"Destroy the enemy's principal ship by ramming her," which 



15 • 

was followed later by a general signal to the same effect. These 
signals were also wigwagged by the Army officers on board. 
The Mononyahcla and Lackaivantm did ram the Tennessee, 
but without effect, and she continued to head straight for the 
Hartford. We had barely hove our anchor up when, under 
four bells, we tried to ram her. She put her helm to starboard, 
- so the blow was only a glancing one, the two ships rasping 
along each other's sides in opposite directions. We gave her 
a broadside^f solid 9-inch shot, but they had not the slightest 
effect on her. Just before striking her, Farragut jumped into 
the port mizzen rigging, above the poop deck, being eager to 
see the effect of the ramming. He laughed at my remon- 
strances as I seized the tails of his frock-coat and tried to pre- 
vent him from getting up there. I then caught up the end of 
the spanker vang, a small rope that happened to be handy, 
and, with his consent, secured him to the mizzen shrouds. I 
stood near him, just inside the rigging on the poop, with a 
drawn revolver, ready to get the drop on anybody aboard the 
ram who mi^ht try to pick him off. Her shells exploded on 
our berth deck, killing and wounding some of the powder divi- 
sion, but doing no serious damage to the ship. Shortly after 
this the ram's smokestack, which was already badly riddled, 
was broken off' above the casemate when the Lackaivanna 
struck her a second time, and the three monitors also punished 
her severely, the Chickasazv carrying away her steering gear 
and the Manhattan and Winnebago penetrating her casemate 
and jamming her port-shutters. Admiral Buchanan was wounded 
in the leg by one of these shots. She was now lying like a log 
in the water, and there was nothing left for her to do but to 
surrender, which she did as the Ossipee was about to ram her. 
I failed to mention that as soon as we had passed inside of 
the three lines of torpedoes Jouett was permitted to cut and 



16 

cast off the lashings which secured the Metaconiet to the Hart- 
ford and to chase the Scbna, and, in obedience to orders, I 
made general signal: "Gunboats chase enemy gunboats.'' The 
Mctacomct soon captured the Selma after a gallant fight, the 
Gaines was driven ashore near Fort Morgan in a sinking con- 
dition, and the Morgan escaped with comparatively slight 
damage, a passing bank of fog contributing materially to their 
escape from capture by our gunboats. 

One of the most gallant things done that day was the 
handling of the Mctaconict's boat by Acting Ensign Nields 
when he, was sent to pick up the survivors of the Tecumseh, 
exposed to the broadside of the Brooklyn and the whole Con- 
federate fire. 

I was very much impressed by the fact that the character of 
the danger which we had to face in going into Mobile Bay had 
a markedly sobering effect upon the boldest and most daredevil 
among us. From the Admiral's detailed report, dated Mobile 
Bay, August 12, 18G-i, I cjuote in this connection : "Regular 
discipline will bring men to any amount of endurance; but 
there is a natural fear of hidden dangers — particularly when 
so awfully destructive of human life as the torpedo — -which 
requires more than discipline to overcome." 

I shall now quote two general orders, issued on August 6 
and T, after the surrender of Fort Gaines, as they throw addi- 
tional light upon the character of this great man. 

General Order, No. 12. Mobile "Bay, August 6, 18G-1 : 

"The Admiral returns thanks to the officers and crews of 
the vessels of the fleet for their gallant conduct during the 
fight of yesterday. 

"It has never been his good fortune to see men do their duty 
with more cheerfulness and courage ; for, although they knew 
that the enemy was prepared with all dexilish means for our 



17 

destruction, and though they witnessed the ahnost instanta- 
neous annihilation of our gallant companions in the Tecumseh 
by a torpedo, and the slaughter of their friends, messmates and 
gunmates on our decks, still there were no evidences of hesita- 
tion in following their commander-in-chief through the line of 
torpedoes and obstructions, of which we knew nothing except 
from the exaggerations of the enemy, who had given out that 
we should all be blown up as certainly as we attempted to enter. 
"For this noble and implicit confidence in their leader, he 
heartily thanks them. 

"D. G. Farragut, 
"Rear Admiral Commanding, 
"IV. G. Blockading Squadron." 

General Order, No. 13 : 

"The Admiral desires tlT£ fleet to return thanks to Almighty 
God for the signal victory over the enemy on the morning of 
the oth instant." 

This true-hearted sailor was as simple, direct and approach- 
able as a child. He knew no such thing as pose. I close, com- 
mending to your thoughtful reading two letters written by 
him — one to his son, dated July 31, ISG-l, and the other to his 
wife, August 1, 1S(U — which show his character as an ideal 
husband and father. 

The two books which best enable you to see him as he was 
are the "Life and Letters of David Glasgow Farragut," by 
Loyall Farragut, and Mahan's "Life of Farragut.'' 

To those who enjoy stirring verse, I commend "The Bay 
Fight," by Acting Ensign H. H. Brownell, and "Farragut's 
Morn,'* by Paymaster William T. Meredith, both of whom 
ser\ed as officers in the Hartford during the battle; also some 



18 

stirring lines on "The Battle of Mobile Bay," by Commodore 
Thomas H. Stevens, United States Navy, who commanded 
the Winnebago during the battle. 

JoHx Crittenden Watson, 
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy (retired). 

Note. — Remarks by the Commander, Rear Admiral C. M. Chester, 
U. S. N. : 

I am sure we have all been interested and instructed in listening to 
the admirable paper prepared by Companion Admiral Watson, and I 
have been especially pleased by its presentation, as I have for a long 
time urged the writer to place upon the records of the Order his 
personal recollections of Admiral Farragut at the Battle of Mobile 
Bay, as the one man who was in intimate association with the great 
Admiral on that momentous occasion, and now the only living veteran 
of the war who could give such testimony first-hand. The innate 
\/modesty of Admiral Watson has frustrated all my efforts to secure this 
valuable contribution to the history of the Civil War until the present 
time ; and of the many personal episodes of that great battle, in which 
he took so conspicuous a part, which he does not mention, 1 should 
like to give a personal recollection of my own regarding his activities 
preceding the battle. 

It will be remembered that Admiral Farragut stated in General Order 
No. 11 that he hoped to be able to have some of the obstructions at the 
entrance to Mobile Bay removed before the battle took place, and for 
V this very important work Lieutenant Watson volunteered, and was 
permitted to perform the dangerous undertaking. The first and most 
important battle of Mobile Bay took place on Friday, August 5, 1864 
y^ (the second being the capture of Fort Morgan by the combined opera- 
tions of the Army and Navy, on August 23, two weeks later). On the 
Sunday night preceding the battle, Lieutenant Watson took charge of 
a large cutter, armed and equipped for action, and, with muffled oars, 
entered the Bay, in spite of the strong picket guard maintained by the 
Confederates to prevent such incursions. He tackled the long line of 
torpedoes strung across the channel, which were held in place and at 
a distance of about 10 feet below the surface of the water by a number 
of buoys placed at intervals in prolongation of the line, and sunk one 
or more of them. This daring exploit was repeated by Watson on 
Monday night and again on Wednesday night (Tuesday night being 
skipped for some reason, possibly to let the young man make up some 
needful rest, as each undertaking was an all-night job). On this last, 
or Wednesday, night that it was possible to act before the light. Wat- 
son's boat crew worked so long and assiduously to drill a hole in one 



19 

of the most important iron buoys he had to deal with in order to sink 
/ft, in spite of the danger of drawing the attention of the enemy. to his 
>/ work by the sound of "his big bass drum," that daylight caught him in 
the act, and he was forced to make a precipitous retreat to regain his 
ship and take part in the Battle of Mobile Bay. How far he entered 
the Bay on these several occasions in the darkness of the night I doubt 
if the Admiral knew himself; but as Tuesday morning he brought back 
with him "five deserters from Fort Gaines," he evidently was in close 
touch with the enemy. This gallant eflfort of the Flag Lieutenant of 
the Fleet to carry out Admiral Farragut's aim to remove the obstruc- 
tion, which would have secured him the Victoria Cross had he been a 
British naval officer, made a deep impression on my youthful mind as a 
lad who had just escaped from the Naval Academy to take part in the 
war; bat I doubt if my friend could recall the deed the main facts of 
which are recorded in the Log Book of the Hartford. 



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